

Message Text

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

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APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.

S/S - SESTEINER

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O R 302341Z APR 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

S E C R E T STATE 098435

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR US JO XF

SUBJECT: VISIT TO WASHINGTON OF KING HUSSEIN

REF: STATE 95780

1. SUMMARY. ATHERTON BRIEFED DINITZ ON HUSSEIN VISIT ALONG LINES REFTEL. HE CONFIRMED THAT KING HAD IN MIND, WHEN CALLING FOR ADEQUATE GENEVA PREPARATIONS, NOT ONLY PARTICIPATION ISSUE BUT SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS THEMSELVES. HE ASSESSED HUSSEIN'S INCREASED OPTIMISM BY END OF VISIT AS RESULTING FROM U.S. ASSURANCES ABOUT CONTINUING IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO OUR RELATIONS WITH JORDAN. DINITZ ASKED IF KING TALKED ABOUT DEMILITARIZATION OF WHOLE WEST SECRET

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BANK, AND ATHERTON EXPLAINED DISCUSSION OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WAS NOT THAT SPECIFIC. DINITZ ASKED IF HUSSEIN ON PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION DISCUSSED OTHER POSSIBILITIES BESIDES UNIFIED ARAB DELEGATION. ATHERTON SAID KING HAD NOT RULED OUT INCLUSION OF PALESTINIANS IN JORDANIAN DELEGATION. DINITZ ASKED WHETHER ATHERTON THOUGHT KING WOULD GO TO GENEVA WITH ONLY WEST AND EAST

BANKERS IN HIS DELEGATION IF SYRIA AND SAUDI ARABIA URGED THIS. ATHERTON QUESTIONED WHETHER THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE UNLESS ALSO AGREED TO BY SADAT WHO, ALONG WITH SYRIA, TAKES POSITION PLO MUST BE INVITED. END SUMMARY.

2. ATHERTON MET APRIL 28 WITH AMBASSADOR DINITZ TO BRIEF HIM ON HUSSEIN VISIT. ATHERTON SAID DISCUSSIONS WITH KING COVERED WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING WITH EACH LEADER CALLING ON THE PRESIDENT. BULK OF DISCUSSIONS DEALT WITH MIDDLE EAST PEACE QUESTIONS, WITH LESS ATTENTION GIVEN TO AREA DEVELOPMENTS AND BILATERAL MATTERS. KING STRESSED HIS VIEW IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT U.S. PLAY ACTIVE ROLE. THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO DOING SO AND TO MIDDLE EAST PEACE. PRESIDENT ALSO STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH JORDAN, WHICH WAS IMPORTANT THIS VISIT BECAUSE KING HAD BEEN A LITTLE CONCERNED.

3. ATHERTON CONTINUED THE PRESIDENT AND KING AGREED GENEVA CONFERENCE FAILURE WOULD HAVE VERY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES, AND IT WAS NECESSARY TO PREPARE GROUND WITH CARE SO AS TO GO TO GENEVA WITH REASONABLE CONFIDENCE IN REAL PROGRESS ONCE THERE. DINITZ ASKED WHETHER KING IN CALLING FOR ADEQUATE PREPARATIONS HAD IN MIND NOT ONLY OVERCOMING QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION BUT ALSO SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES THEMSELVES, AND ATHERTON CONFIRMED THIS. ATHERTON SAID THE PRESIDENT TOLD KING AS HE HAD TOLD EACH VISITOR THAT AFTER THIS ROUND OF TALKS WITH AREA LEADERS ENDING WITH FAHD VISIT, HE WAS THINKING OF SENDING THE SECRETARY BACK
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TO AREA. IF IT APPEARED THEN THAT POSSIBILITIES EXISTED FOR PROGRESS AT GENEVA, U.S. WOULD BE VERY ACTIVE. KING REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF KNOWING IN ADVANCE WHERE GENEVA WOULD BE GOING. KING AGREED EFFORT TO RECONVENE GENEVA WAS IMPORTANT THIS YEAR.

4. ATHERTON SAID KING AT END OF VISIT WAS ENCOURAGED. DINITZ ASKED WHY. ATHERTON REPLIED THAT KING'S CONCERNS ABOUT HIS U.S. RELATIONSHIP WERE ALLAYED. KING HAD NOT KNOWN THIS ADMINISTRATION. FOR EXAMPLE, PEOPLE IN JORDAN HAD SUGGESTED TO HIM THE PRESIDENT'S CALL FOR HOMELAND FOR PALESTINIANS MIGHT MEAN REPLACEMENT FOR JORDAN. ON HEARING THAT WE CONSIDER U.S.-JORDAN RELATIONSHIP AS IMPORTANT AS EVER AND THAT PRESIDENT REGARDS HIM AS IMPORTANT ACTOR IN SITUATION, KING'S MOOD IMPROVED.

5. ATHERTON SAID THE PRESIDENT MADE SPECIAL POINT ABOUT PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF STEPS TOWARD NORMALIZATION AS PART OF PEACE SETTLEMENT AND DISCUSSED VARIOUS MANIFESTA-

TIONS--CONTACTS, TRADE, ETC. KING SHOWED CLEARLY HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE PART OF ANY SETTLEMENT. ATHERTON REMARKED KING HAD ALWAYS BEEN AHEAD OF OTHER ARAB LEADERS IN THIS RESPECT. DINITZ AGREED, WHILE NOTING THAT KING SOME MONTHS AGO BEGAN ALLOWING ISRAELI ARABS TO CROSS BRIDGE AND YET TWO DAYS AGO RESCINDED THIS. DINITZ ADDED THAT HUSSEIN'S ATTITUDE ON GENERAL SUBJECT OF OPEN BRIDGES HAD BEEN WELL ADVANCED OF OTHER ARABS.

6. ATHERTON EXPLAINED THAT ON TERRITORIAL QUESTION KING REAFFIRMED HIS VIEW THAT WEST BANK SHOULD BE RETURNED TO JORDAN WHILE LEAVING OPEN POSSIBILITY OF MINOR RECTIFICATIONS. HUSSEIN ALSO CALLED FOR RETURN OF EAST JERUSALEM, WITH ARRANGEMENTS TO ASSURE BOTH PARTS WOULD CONSTITUTE OPEN CITY WITH FREE MOVEMENT AND ACCESS. DISCUSSIONS ABOUT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS SUCH AS DMZS HAD BEEN LIMITED.

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HUSSEIN SAID IF HE WERE SOVEREIGN IN WEST BANK, HE WOULD BE OPEN MINDED AND WILLING TO DISCUSS ANY ARRANGEMENTS. DINITZ ASKED IF KING TALKED ABOUT DEMILITARIZATION OF ENTIRE WEST BANK, AND ATHERTON EXPLAINED DISCUSSIONS DID NOT GET THAT SPECIFIC.

7. ATHERTON SAID EMPHASIS IN KING'S REMARKS ON PALESTINIAN QUESTION WAS ON SELF-DETERMINATION. HE FELT PALESTINIANS SHOULD HAVE RIGHT TO SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES AND SAID HE WOULD LIVE WITH RESULTS--WITH FEDERATION, SEPARATE PALESTINIAN STATE, OR RESTORATION OF PRE-1967 UNITY. HUSSEIN PERSONALLY BELIEVED THAT PALESTINIANS WOULD WANT LINK WITH JORDAN, AND HE EVIDENTLY WANTED THIS, TOO, NOTING HIS 1972 UNITED ARAB KINGDOM PROPOSAL. HE SAID SELF-DETERMINATION COULD BE CARRIED OUT UNDER SOME INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY. DINITZ ASKED WHETHER KING WAS TALKING ONLY ABOUT RESIDENTS OF WEST BANK. ATHERTON SAID HE BELIEVED THIS WAS CASE BUT DOUBTED KING HAD THOUGHT THROUGH ALL RAMIFICATIONS OF THIS IDEA.

8. ATHERTON CONTINUED HUSSEIN WAS CURIOUS TO KNOW WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAD IN MIND ON PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. THE PRESIDENT EXPLAINED IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR U.S. TO ATTEMPT TO DEFINE NATURE OF PALESTINIAN HOMELAND AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO JORDAN WHICH SHOULD BE DEALT WITH AS PART OF NEGOTIATING PROCESS. ON PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION ISSUE, HUSSEIN INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER SERIES OF ARRANGEMENTS. HIS PREFERENCE CONTINUED TO BE SINGLE ARAB DELEGATION INCLUDING PLO, ALTHOUGH HE WAS UNSURE THIS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO PLO. DINITZ INTERJECTED, OR TO EGYPT. DINITZ ASKED IF KING DESCRIBED

OTHER POSSIBILITIES. ATHERTON SAID HUSSEIN DID NOT RULE OUT IDEA OF INCLUDING PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN DELEGATION.

9. ATHERTON SAID THAT AS TO STRUCTURE OF CONFERENCE, HUSSEIN LIKE SYRIANS PREFERRED FUNCTIONAL WORKING GROUPS.

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SOME OF THESE WOULD INVOLVE SINGLE ARAB DELEGATION, WHILE OTHERS WOULD WORK BETTER ON BILATERAL BASIS, KING THOUGHT. ATHERTON OPINED THAT HUSSEIN'S APPROACH TO BOTH REPRESENTATION AND STRUCTURE RESULTED FROM HIS DESIRE NOT TO BE ALONE. DINITZ SAID ONE COULD UNDERSTAND THIS DESIRE, BUT HE WONDERED IF HUSSEIN WAS NOT CONCERNED THAT IN THIS SITUATION TOO, OTHERS COULD MAKE COMPROMISES AT HIS EXPENSE. ATHERTON THOUGHT THAT JORDAN DURING SO MANY YEARS OF HUSSEIN'S LONG REIGN HAD BEEN ISOLATED IN ARAB WORLD, KING DID NOT WANT THIS TO HAPPEN AGAIN.

10. ATHERTON ASKED IF DINITZ HAD READ HUSSEIN'S TWO SPEECHES. DINITZ INDICATED THESE WERE GOOD SPEECHES FROM KING'S VIEW POINT BUT CONTAINED NOTHING NEW. ATHERTON NOTED KING HAD SPOKEN SEVERAL TIMES OF COEXISTENCE. DINITZ SAID ISRAELI JOURNALISTS HAD BEEN BARRED FROM HUSSEIN'S PRESS CONFERENCE, TO WHICH ATHERTON EXPRESSED SURPRISE, RECALLING SADAT'S PRESS CONFERENCE HAD INCLUDED ISRAELI JOURNALISTS.

11. DINITZ ASKED ATHERTON IF HE THOUGHT HUSSEIN COULD COMPLY IF SYRIA AND SAUDI ARABIA TOLD HIM TO GO TO GENEVA WITH WEST BANK AND EAST BANK PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES IN HIS DELEGATION. DINITZ SAID HE POSED THIS QUESTION BECAUSE OF SLACKENED SYRIAN AND SAUDI COMMITMENT TO PLO SINCE LEBANESE CRISIS IN CONTRAST TO EGYPT. ATHERTON REPLIED HE THOUGHT IT DOUBTFUL THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE AT THIS STAGE WITHOUT SADAT'S AGREEMENT. BUT IF ARABS LATER COULD NOT REACH AGREEMENT ON PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION ISSUE, THINGS MIGHT BE DIFFERENT. DINITZ ASKED WHETHER HUSSEIN IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS REVEALED SOME FEAR OF PLO STATE ON WEST BANK AS THREAT TO HIMSELF. ATHE TON REPLIED KING MADE CLEAR IN PRIVATE HIS LACK OF TRUST OF PRESENT PLO LEADERSHIP BUT SHOWED CONFIDENCE THAT WEST BANKERS IF THEY COULD EXPRESS PREFERENCE WITHOUT INTIMIDATION WOULD NOT OPT FOR ARAFAT AND WOULD WANT LINK

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WITH JORDAN. DINITZ COMMENTED THAT HUSSEIN BY GIVING

PUBLIC LIP SERVICE TO PLO CREATED IMPRESSION HE COULD
LIVE WITH PLO. THIS IN TURN WEAKENED RESOLVE OF
INDIVIDUALS WHO BELIEVED ONLY REALISTIC SOLUTION WAS LINK
WITH JORDAN. ATHERTON NOTED THAT KING HAD THOUGHT ABOUT
THIS AND WAS SEEKING QUIETLY TO SHIFT EMPHASIS FROM PLO
TO PROCESS OF SELF-DETERMINATION WHICH WOULD REVEAL
WHO REALLY SHOULD REPRESENT THE PALESTINIANS. HUSSEIN
COULD NOT AFFORD TO APPEAR TO BE BREAKING WITH RABAT
SUMMIT DECISIONS IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. DINITZ VOICED
CONCERN THAT EVEN IF PLEBISCITE RESULTED IN INDEPENDENT
NON-PLO WEST BANK STATE, PLO COULD TAKE SUCH STATE OVER
UNLESS IT WAS LINKED WITH JORDAN FROM BEGINNING. DINITZ,

BELIEVED HUSSEIN SHOULD BE CONCERNED ABOUT SUCH
EVENTUALITY. ATHERTON SAID DISCUSSIONS WITH KING DID NOT
GET INTO SUCH SUBJECTS.

CHRISTOPHER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DEBRIEFINGS, CHIEF OF STATE VISITS, PEACE PLANS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 30-Apr-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE098435
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: WBSMITH:BDF
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770152-0839
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t1977041/aaaaaack.tel
Line Count: 242
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 41d7309b-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 77 STATE 95780
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 02-Feb-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2656213
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: VISIT TO WASHINGTON OF KING HUSSEIN
TAGS: PFOR, OVIP, JO, XF, US, (HUSSEIN I), (ATHERTON, ALFRED L JR), (DINITZ, SIMCHA)
To: TEL AVIV
Type: TE
vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/41d7309b-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009